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Aristotle on Reason. Practical Reason, and Living Veil
D. K.W. Modrak
From the beginning the Nicomachean Ethics is about practical thinking,
how we choose or should choose to act and to urge others to act.1 Any form
of thought that requires the conceptualization of one or more actions is a
type of practical thinking.2 Thus the deliberations of a legislator, the
scheming of a huckster and the choices of a good woman are all instances of
practical reason. In view of its importance, it is especially disturbing that
Aristotle's account of practical thinking is open to the charge of inadequacy
on two major fronts: ( 1) the cogency of his analysis of moral weakness; and
(2) the absence of a genuine conceptual niche for ohronesis. whose work
seems to be done by ethike arete, by euboulia and by soohia.
I
Since Aristotle's treatment of akrasia sheds considerable light on his
conception of practical thinking, I propose to begin with it. Socrates left his
successors with a dilemma: either give up the project of a rationalistic ethics
or deny the existence of moral weakness. Indeed the failure to act according
to one s best judgment about which action to perform seems peculiarly
irrational and presumably would have been dismissed long ago as a form of
madness had it not been quite widespread among rational animals. This fact
causes Aristotle to reject Socrates’ view that akrasia is impossible, even
though he agrees with Socrates that right reason issues in right actions.
Aristotle's strategy is to establish the possibility of akrasia while at the same
time retaining the kernal of truth in Socrates' argument—namely that
knowledge of the universal is not dragged around by passion. According to
Aristotle, akrasia involves a perceptual failure: the akratic agent fails to
apply a general principle s/he accepts to the particular circumstances that
provide the context for the action. The akratic agent resembles the
geometry student who knows that the sum of the angles of a triangle are
180° but fails to realize that a given figure is a triangle and hence is
ignorant of the sum of its angles, or the person who knows that mules are
sterile and yet nevertheless has the momentary impression that a particular
mule is pregnant (67a35-39).

1 I have not been able "in the short time allowed by the dock'' to mention
the many articles and books that have influenced my thinking about the
topics discussed here. Below I cite other authors only when their work is
explicitly mentioned.
2 I use "action" both for a plan of action existing as the object of an agent's
thought and for an observable performance in the physical world.

Reviewed from the perspective of Aristotle's account of the relation
between thought and perception, this line of analysis becomes more
plausible. Apprehending a sensible particular as an instance of a universal
is a constant feature of thinking. This feature is at the heart of Aristotle's
claim that even the most abstract forms of reasoning are not possible
without imagery (phantasmata) .3 In such cases the image presents a
sensible particular that the thinker uses as an arbitrary example of the
universal, the proper object of the thought.34 In the case of perceptual
judgment and practical reasoning, the apprehension of the sensible
particular is at the center of the cognitive experience, and the particular is
no longer treated indifferently as an arbitrary example but becomes instead
the specific object of the judgment. Here the point of subsuming the
particular under a given universal is not to enable the thinker to
contemplate the universal but rather to enable her or him to categorize the
particular. Classifying concrete objects provides the information needed for
manipulating these objects in action and for understanding the world in
which we live. Since every concrete particular exemplifies a number of
different universale, each standing in numerous relations to other universale,
the failure to apprehend the particular as an instance of a specific universal
is easily explained (cf.67a26-30; 1142a20-22; 1147a5-7). Moreover, the
complexity of the relations among universal also leaves room for further
confusions, e.g., for perceiving that C, a honey dessert, is yellow and hence
misperceiving C's flavor (cf. 425b4-5).
Just as a perceiver may fail to bring her/his general knowledge to
bear on a particular case, the akrates may fail to respond in accordance with
his/her moral principles. The akratic agent fails to recognize that his/her
present situation falls under the appropriate universal and acts instead on
the basis of another applicable universal ( 1147a24-b3). Aristotle supposes
that the akrates with a sweet tooth holds two true beliefs, namely, "sweets
should be avoided," and "sweets are pleasant to eat." He spies a dessert,
concludes, "this is pleasant to eat," and promptly eats the dessert. Only later
does he realize that the other principle also held in this instance. Because
practical reasoning ultimately terminates in a judgment about what is to be
done, its object is a particular embedded in a context supplied by the agent's
character and intellect. In the case described the context consists in pleasant
associations rather than moral principles. Since this context affirms the
pleasurableness of the object, ohantasia as the vehicle for pleasurable
sensations is the operative faculty instead of reason (433al0; 1150b28). By
assimilating akrasia to a more general type of cognitive failure—the failure
3 4 2 7b l6 ,4 3 1 al5 ,4 3 2 a8 ,4 4 % 3 1 , 1378b9.
4 See Modrak, A risto tle: The Pow er o f Perception, chapters 5 and 7.

to recognize a particular as an instantiation of a specific universal, Aristotle
preserves the intelligibility of akratic behavior.
Unfortunately, Aristotle's explanation of akrasia seems at odds with
his treatment of moral principles. Principles of conduct are not merely
entertained; they are ingrained in one's character as a result of having
performed the right actions with the right attitudes in the past. To know in
this instance is to interpret one s situation in accordance with the principle.
To meet this objection, Aristotle emphasizes the tenuous quality of the
akratic agent s knowledge of the principle; just as a drunkard can quote
philosophy without understanding or a student parrot his/her teacher, the
akrates espouses the principle. Now the explanation is threatened from
another quarter: in what sense can the akrates be said to have knowledge at
all? To the extent that Aristotle has an answer, it must turn on the
difference between accepting a principle as true and having made it a part of
oneself (cf.l 147al0-24)5 The more deeply a principle is ingrained in one s
character, the less likely one is to fail to recognize its applications.
On my reading of N. B. VII.3, the akrates does not apply the
appropriate universal to a specific object. Charles takes the opposite tack.56
He believes that Aristotle allows the akratic agent to draw the conclusion
that doing x is best. This conclusion is then ignored in favor of the
conclusion that y is good. The akratic agent (Charles says) fails to
appropriately accept the first conclusion due to his not bringing his
motivational judgments in line with his valuational ones. There is little
doubt that Aristotle's analysis turns in part on a gap between value
judgments and motivation, for Aristotle claims that the akrates unlike the
akolastos preserves the arche, the moral principle that should issue in the
right action ( 1151 a 11 -19 ). There are, however, two serious drawbacks to
Charles' development of this insight. First VII. 3 offers scant support for it.7
Not only is there no suggestion that the akrates completes two practical
syllogisms, but there is also no mention of a difference between types of
acceptance or between value and desire. The nature of practical first
5 The akrates retains the principle among his/her beliefs and thus
preserves the arche unlike the akolastos who rejects the principle as false
(1151al 1-19; cf. 1140bl6-19).
6 D. Charles, A risto tie 's P hilosophy o f Action, chaps. 3 and 4.
7 Later at 1151al-3, a type of akrates who deliberates is mentioned but
nowhere does Aristotle suggest that this deliberation issues in a decision to
act. The explanation given in MB. VII.3 denies that the akrates draws but
ignores the right conclusion nor does the De Motu An.'s account of action
leave room for such behavior.

principles is such that a total split between valuational and motivational
factors is not a possibility. What happens in the case of akrasia is a partial
split occasioned by the akratic agent s tenuous hold on the principle and the
subsumption of his/her particular circumstances under a competing
desirability criterion.
But you might object: Aristotle says that the akrates when he is in a
state of passion either does not have the last premiss (teleutaia protasis) or
has it in the sense in which a drunken man may utter the verses of
Empedocles ( 1147b9-12). If "teleutaia protasis'*refers to the conclusion of
the correct syllogism, then isn't this evidence that the akrates reaches two
conclusions instead of one? It is not. Aristotle typically uses protasis for
premiss rather than conclusion and this usage would cohere better with the
restofV II.3. Unfortunately, identifying the teleutaia protasis with the
minor premiss does not solve all our problems. In the sweet food example,
the akrates seems to have the appropriate minor premiss, namely, this food
is sweet, which seems to figure in both the realized syllogism and the correct
alternative. Nevertheless, Aristotle might believe that in most real life cases
of practical reasoning, different middle terms are operative. For instance,
the same food is dry and bitter. Were the akrates thinking clearly he would
perceive the food’s dryness, subsume it under the appropriate universal and
eat it, as it is, he responds to the premiss, "this is bitter," and avoids the
food.
Aristotle’s detailed explanation of akrasia in VI 1.3 is tailored to fit
the impetuous akrates who confused by sensual desire fails to put 2 and 2
together. Subsequently Aristotle mentions a type of akrates who deliberates
(11 5 1 a l-3 ,1152a27-28), but presumably s/he reaches only an intermediate
conclusion, since here too the difference between akrasia (of all types) and
vice is drawn on the grounds that the akrates acts against choice (para
prohairesin) ( 1151 a8 ). The akrates might decide, for instance, that a type of
grain should be eaten because it is a dry food, but fail to make the
judgments necessary to implement this decision (cf. 1147a5-7). Aristotle
hypothesizes that the failure to perceive one's current situation in
accordance with one’s internalized values must ultimately be explained by
appeal to a physiological state that causes one to lose the proper perspective.
Just as in illness, we misperceive our circumstances, believing for instance
that a «rack on the wall is a dangerous animal, in states of sensual arousal or
anger, we misperceive our circumstances (460b3-l 1). If we are akrateis. we
are prone to such misperceptions. Since perception is a psychophysical state,
disturbances in the body occasion perceptual mistakes (cf.460bl 1-16); hence
akrasia is partially due to a bodily state (1 147b6-9, cf.l 151a5-6). Here
again Aristotle extends his analysis of perceptual error in general to akrasia.

Despite its physiological component, akrasia is blameworthy. The
blameworthiness of an act, for Aristotle, is not decided solely by reference to
its circumstances; the relevant question is whether the agent might have had
a different character and hence might have acted correctly (cf.l 114a4-7).
The akratic agent through self-discipline might well have acquired the
ability to withstand his/her sensual desires, such that when confronted with
a sweet food, for instance, s/he did not become disoriented and fail to
recognize which universal to subsume the food under. It is this failure for
which the akrates is blamed not for succumbing to a temptation that given
his character was in fact irresistible (cf.l 114a3-23).
II
The relation between the agent s immediate circumstances and the
universels applied to those circumstances provided the key to understanding
Aristotle's solution to the problem of akrasia. The same relation is central to
his account of ohronesis.
Now all the states [of practical thought] converge, as
might be expected, to the same point; for when we speak of
judgement (gnome) and understanding (sunesis) and practical
wisodm (ohronesis) and reason (nous) we credit the same
people with possessing judgement and reason and with having
practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties deal
with ultimates (ton eschaton). i.e., with particulars (ton kath'
hekaston). (1143a25-28)
Phronesis is the paradigm for practical thinking; it includes all of the
laudatory aspects of the other forms, and it enables its possessor to live
virtuously. Phronesis is "an eye of the soul" that enables a virtuous person
to "see" what should be done in a particular case (1 144a30; cf.l 114b6-8,
1143b 13) Just as a perceiver may have to take various steps to achieve a
clear perception of a selected object (for instance, move closer to the object,
remove objects obstructing the view, etc.), the ohronimos may have to
consider various strategies initially. Nonetheless, the recognition of the right
strategy has the same immediacy as an act of sense perception.8 The
"seeing" of the ohronimos is a more complex operation than seeing a color,
and thus at 1142a26-29 Aristotle compares it to the perception of a common
sensible—an object such as shape perceived through the joint activity of
several sense modalities. When we perceive a particular triangular shape
through the common sense, we apprehend that figure as an instantiation of
8 See Modrak, “Aisthesis in the Practical Syllosism," Philosophical Studies 30.

the universal, triangularity, while ohronesis determines the right rule
embodied in the morally correct action. Through ohronesis. the agent
apprehends the end as manifested in particular actions.9 Similarly when a
ohronimos recognizes that a particular performance is an act of courage, s/he
apprehends the act as an instantiation of a universal principle prescribing
courageous behavior.10
Aristotle's grounds for assimilating practical thinking to a kind of
moral perception are several. Elsewhere he uses the distinction between
particular and universal to differentiate between perceptual and noetic
activity, and thus he associates practical thinking with a kind of perception.
In addition, all thinking is closely connected with perception. Thinking
depends upon imagery. Even the most abstract objects are thought in
images (ohantasmata) that function as sensuous contents (aisthemata) for
noetic activity (431al5, 432a9). Thus a certain type of perceptual activity,
namely ohantasia. serves as the substratum for thinking in general.
Practical thinking is even more closely related to perceptual activity because
it is directed upon concrete particulars that are the objects of perception. In
the De A nim a Aristotle extends the explanatory model for perception to
thinking.11 On this model the cognitive object determines the character of
the cognitive activity. In the case of practical thinking, the object as
represented determines the character of the thought and the corresponding
action. The representation of a dessert as sweet and delightful determines
the character of the akrates*cognition and behavior; the representation of
the same dessert as sweet and harmful determines the character of the
soohron s thought and action.
The perceptual character of ohronesis causes Aristotle to compare
ohronesis to theoretical nous which apprehends the ultimate principles
(primitive propositions) of a science. Both faculties are concerned with the
expression of the universal in the particular; nous arrives at its objects
through the apprehension of particular cases (88a4-8; 100al4-bl5;l 143a35b6), and ohronesis apprehends its objects as instantiations of universals.
They differ in that the objects of nous provide the upper limit in terms of
generality whereas the objects of ohronesis are ultimate particulars, specific
actions to be performed in unique situations.
9 An action manifests or exemplifies a principle of conduct if it accords with
that principle.
10 To use Irwin s translation of kata ton orthon logon ( A ristotJe
N icom aeñe an Ethics)·, the morally correct action "expresses the right rule."
11 De An. III.4 ,6-8. See also Modrak, chapter five.

The account of ohronesis seems fairly straightforward until we begin
to consider ohronesis in relation to moral virtue and the lesser intellectual
virtue, euboulia. To make a niche for ohronesis in relation to the former,
Aristotle stresses first the role of ohronesis in determining the standard by
which means are chosen and second the role of ohronesis in choosing the
means to ends fixed by moral virtue. This is already problematic, and the
difficulty is compounded when he defines euboulia as correctness in
deliberation about means to an end apprehended by ohronesis. Is there an
interpretative strategy that would allow Aristotle to maintain all three
positions without inconsistency?
Phronesis is necessary for moral virtue, and virtue is necessary for
ohronesis (Æ E VI. 12). Some of Aristotle's remarks suggest a quite
uncomplicated connection-virtue provides the end to be achieved by an
action and ohronesis apprehends the means to that end ( 1144a6-9). The
virtuous person seeks in his or her actions to achieve a mean between
extremes of passion. Since passions do not respond immediately to
argument, virtue is acquired through a process of conditioning. If we
consistently avoid over-eating, we come in time to desire only appropriate
amounts of food. This desire is constitutive of temperance. During the early
developmental stage, the foundation for virtue can be acquired through
training provided by persons possessing ohronesis. but mature virtue
involves the autonomous choice of right actions. Deciding what and how
much to eat on any given occasion requires moral insight as well as the
general desire to be temperate. On the other hand, the ability to recognize
through ohronesis which amount is appropriate needs the context
determined by the desire to be temperate. "This is why we call soohrosune
by this name; we imply that it preserves (sozousan) one's ohronesis."
1140bl 1-12.
This tidy picture becomes more complicated when we look at other
parts of the story. By definition, moral virtue is a disposition to choose the
mean relative to oneself determined by the principle (logos) which the
ohronimos would use ( 1107al ). Virtue is a hexis that issues in right actions
performed at the right time in the right way. These actions are chosen for
their own sake; they embody a mean between extremes of appetites or
passions; they are the same in character as the actions that an agent must
perform to acquire moral virtue. In the choice of a virtuous action, both
deliberation and desire play a role; the agent acts in accordance with both
his/her values and wants. What then is the logos determined by ohronesis?
The easiest answer is: the standard which defines the virtue in question.
The objective standard in the case of courage—the mean between cowardice
and rashness— is the recognition that under certain circumstances one ought

to be willing to die for one’s city-state (111 5a25-35). The drawback to this
answer is that a person might behave rashly who possessed this logos. Such
a person would construe "appropriate circumstances” too broadly. The gap
between general principles and particular circumstances motivates Aristotle
to posit a distinctly practical form of reason ( 1141 b 14-21 ). Perhaps, then,
the logos just is the mean between extremes in this context. If so, the
definition becomes redundant—"to choose the mean as determined by the
mean...” A compromise between the two seems to be the best answer: the
logos is the application of the correct general principle to the particular
circumstances. The standard for the courageous act on the battlefield is not
the completely general and hence qualified standard, but rather the
prescriptive principle, one ought to risk one's life for one's city-state.12
In comparing ohronesis to euboulia. Aristotle associates ohronesis
with the end, and similar considerations seem to motivate the claim that the
akrates might be clever but not practically wise. Euboulia is the ability to
deliberate well about the proper means to a good end. To reflect on the
means to an end, one must in some sense consider the end. The difference
between ohronesis and euboulia must turn on the difference between
apprehending an end and subsuming it under some broader objective. One
might, for example, exhibit euboulia in determining how best to hold one’s
battle position but ohronesis in deciding to do this in order to behave
courageously. The akrates by contrast fails to subsume his immediate ends
under the appropriate moral principle. Hence the akrates lacks ohronesis.
He might, nevertheless, be quite good at selecting effective means to his
immediate ends.
At this point, Aristotle seems to have two lines on ohronesis. One
establishes that ohronesis is the source of the moral prescriptions that are
exhibited in the virtuous person's actions (1 143a8-10). The other identifies
ohronesis with the ability to recognize which actions will satisfy the virtuous
person's ends. Although each position is coherent and provides the basis for
distinguishing between ohronesis and the other moral and intellectual
virtues, the fit between the two remains problematic. If Aristotle has an
answer, it must turn on construing the notions of end and means in a way
that allows both ohronesis and virtue to be involved in the determination of
both the end and the chosen means. In the case of ends, this is relatively
easy. Reason unaided by desire cannot bring about action (433a23-30);
unless the agent wants to be courageous or has some other goal requiring
12 Cf. Aristotle's formulation of the major premisses of practical syllogisms
in N.E VII.3 and De M otu An. 7.

courageous action, s/he will not behave courageously. Wants can be
informed by reason but they are at the core non-rational and respond to
conditioning rather than argument. Courage is the state that results from
conditioning the emotional capacity for fear. Together virtue and ohronesis
fix the end; the former by providing the emotional basis for adopting an end,
and the latter by conceptualizing it. The first premiss of a practical syllogism
expresses the content of the intellectual component of a practical principle
while the motivational component determines its mode of apprehension.13
Included among the akratic agent's beliefs is the moral principle that should
issue in the right action. But the principle is not put into play because the
appetitive/e motional state of the agent is inhospitable to its application. In
contrast, the soohron’s character insures that his desires will not obscure his
principles.

Ill
In N B. VI. 12, Aristotle ponders, what good will wisdom (soohia) do
us if ohronesis is sufficient for eudaimonia and conversely if wisdom is
sufficient of what use will ohronesis be? In Book X, he compounds the
problem by suggesting that soohia is sufficient. This prompts the question:
can we by appealing toAristotie’s conception of thinking find support for an
inclusive conception of the final good where both soohia and ohronesis have
a role to play? There are striking similarities between the operation of
theoretical nous and practical nous. In both cases, sensuous contents of
particulars are manipulated by the thinker in a way that yields a universal
instantiated by the particular. The direction of the thought is different
insofar as the particulars serve solely as the means to the universal in
theoretical thinking but remain at the center of the cognition in practical
thinking. Moreover, the ability to move from particular cases to universals
is essential to both types of thinking. All objects of knowledge are derived
from particulars;14 and ohronesis as exercised by the legislator is the
apprehension of general principles. Since thinking about more difficult
objects enables one to think even more clearly about other objects (429b34), the person possessing soohia will be especially well-equipped to think

13 See Modrak, ,lAisthesis■■■,,
14 Pst. An. 1.18.11.19; M et IV, De An. ÏII.8.

about practical questions. *5 Yet at best this only shows that the possession
of sophia will benefit the ohronimos not the converse.
A more promising approach is to look at the De A nim ât account of
the nsuche. since the joint activity of the perceptual, appetitive and noetic
faculties envisaged there provides the theoretical foundation for an inclusive
conception of human excellence. This conception is prominent in the analysis
of action. "These two then appear to be the sources of movement, appetite
and mind (nous), if one supposes that imagination is a kind of thought
(voesin)" (433al 0-11 ). Every voluntary movement of an animal of any sort
has a cognitive component, the presentation through sense or intellect of a
putative object of desire, and a motivational component the active desire to
pursue or avoid the object presented.16 The convergence of cognitive and
motivational objects is typically in the case of humans the convergence of
rational and appetitive faculties. This is why Aristotle includes both in the
description of virtue. Moreover, since action based on deliberation is typical
of human beings, the intellectual virtues will be as necessary for right action
as the moral ones. Even though the employment of practical nous will be
far more important than that of theoretical nous. Aristotle in view of the
similarities among noetic activités, quite naturally assumes that people who
exhibit one type of nous are likely to possess the other as well ( 1143a2528).
Rationality distinguishes human life from other forms of animal life;
yet rationality is dependent upon the perceptual faculty for its objects.
"Since seemingly nothing exists separate from sensible magnitudes, the
objects of thought (noeta) are in the sensible forms, both abstract objects and
the states and affections of sensible things." (432a4-6) In addition, a
perceptual power, imagination, is the source of the images that serve as the
material substrata for thought. Because it is dependent upon the perceptual
faculty, the rational faculty is indirectly dependent upon the body;
however, the perceptual faculty is exercised through bodily organs and
hence is dependent in a quite straight-forward way on the nutritive faculty.
Thus the exercise of a human mind differs in important particulars from the
*5 Granted, in practical contexts Aristotle sometimes compares the person
who has theory but no practical experience unfavorably to the person having
experience but lacking theoretical knowledge ( 1141 b 17-21 ). However, the
knowledge in question is quite specialized and limited. Sophia is the highest
virtue precisely because it is the most comprehensive form of knowledge;
hence it is unlikely that Aristotle would believe that a person lacking in
years and experience could possess sonhia.
16 De An. III.9-11; De M otu An. 6-7.

life of a disembodied mind. Consequently, the fit between the psychology
and an account of human flourishing that identified human excellence with
the superior function of the most abstract form of reasoning could scarcely
be worst.
Nevertheless, we seem to find a peculiarly intellectualist conception of
human life at the end of the Nico m ache an Ethics. Consider, for example,
(a) the identification of the person with the power of thought (to
diavoetikon: to vooun) in N E IX.4 and X.717 or (b) the identification of the
highest virtue with contemplation in N E X.7-8. With respect to (a) it is
worth noting that the person is identified not with the capacity for
contemplation per se but rather with the faculty for thought. The activities
of the latter include practical thinking as well contemplation, and excellence
in the exercise of this faculty will consist in all forms of intellectual virtue.*18
Since ohronesis requires moral virtue, an inclusive conception of eudaimonia
would seem to follow from the identification of the person with his/her
rational faculty. In addition, in N E IX.9, human life is described as
essentially the activity of perceiving or thinking, and the reflective
awareness of self is the consciousness of these activities. This represents a
further broadening of the conception of the distinctly human core capacities
to include all forms of cognition.
By contrast the conception of eudaimonia in M E X.7-8 seems to be
irredeemably intellectualist. Even though Aristotle calls the virtue of the
composite human being "human virtue” and contemplation "god-like," he
nevertheless urges us to strain every muscle to live as much like gods as
possible. Eudaimonia realized through contemplation is perfect and
separate.19 Certain features of Aristotle's account mitigate against a radical
separation of contemplation from other forms of virtue. The life of
contemplation requires the necessities of life (1177a30) and to this extent
would require at least some of the moral virtues. While it is possible to
exercise soohia alone, living among other scholars facillitates its use
( 1177b 1). Living in a community with others requires ohronesis and the
moral virtues. Finally, unlike the gods we are not able to engage in
contemplation continuously; hence at times even the wisest among us can
only achieve secondary eudaimonia. "the life expressing the other virtue",
namely, moral virtue, for which ohronesis is needed. In short, there is an
*7 1116al8, 23; cf. 1178a2-7.
18 Even in X.8, the contrast is drawn between the life of reason and the life
of moral virtue not between two types of intellectual virtue (soohia and
ohronesisM 1178a8-b8).
19 1178a23: kechorismene; 1177a 18: teleia.

inclusive conception of human excellence at work here too, but it is one that
countenances a hierarchical ordering of faculties and virtues. Thinking in its
most excellent form will not be practical.
It is widely believed that the presence of an inteilectualist strain in
Aristotle's ethics undermines the project of identifying human excellence
with the life of the ohronimos. Up to a point, it does. However, the
theoretical requirements of the life of ohronesis and the practical
requirements of the life of contemplation have the consequence that the life
of an actual eudaimon. philosopher or statesman, would be a mixed life.

